We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund win favor with voting members of the Security Council.

James Vreeland (Ph.D., New York University, 1999) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University. He will join the faculty of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service as an Associate Professor in January 2009. Professor Vreeland conducts research in the area of international political economy. His research explores a wide range of policy outcomes: economic growth and the distribution of income under programs of economic reform, transparency and the dissemination of information under various political systems, the foreign policy positions of developing countries when participating in prominent international bodies, and even governmental decisions to engage in the practice torture. His research is most known for its treatment of international institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, and more recently the World Bank and the United Nations. Vreeland's research has appeared in International Organization, Journal of Development Economics, Political Analysis, World Development, The Review of International Organizations, and International Political Science Review.