From Codevelopment to Solidarity Development: French Policies of Subsidizing Migrant Transmission Mechanisms in a Eurafircan Context

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Abstract: France’s co-development policy is one of Europe’s longest-standing conceptualizations in practice of the migration-and-development-nexus. Co-development associates France to a migrant Diaspora’s transnational engagements. According to this partnership paradigm, France co-funds remittances, networks, skills and knowledge transfers in view to stimulate source country development and reduce migratory pressure. This article explains the multi-level structure of co-development policy and traces its complex trajectory over time and space from a financial to a fiscal instrument. As it responded to Diaspora criticism, we find that migration control and security policy rationales were replaced by strategies to ease migrant source countries’ adjustments to a globalizing economy. A particular focus of this article is on how France invests into de-fiscalizing migrants’ revenue and what effects this shift from financial to fiscal measures may have on migratory flows. We identify five benefits of the co-development tax break: non-discriminatory application in terms of nationality, engaging the financial sector in migration policy formulation, lowering government expenditure, promoting the bancarization of savings and enhancing migrants’ trust in the use of savings. While the final verdict on co-development tax breaks for revenue-collection is still outstanding, France’s migration-fiscal policy-nexus may be an experiment worth replicating on a more global scale.
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1. Introduction

Codevelopment is the process through which immigrants contribute to the socioeconomic development of their country of origin while integrating into the country to which they have immigrated, to the mutual benefit of both countries. France, which ranks fifth among the top migrant-receiving countries after the United States, Russia, Germany, and Ukraine (World Bank 2008:1) was one of the first countries to recognize the value of codevelopment and of the key transnational role the diaspora has played in source country development (Daum 2007/2008; de Haas 2006; Katseli 2008; Levitt 2009).

According to the “integrated development” model, which co-development embodies, a migrants’ community of origin is linked to its counterpart in the destination country (GCIM 2005:8,64,73,77), whereby the destination country is added as a “partner” to the process. As such, co-development overcomes the bipolar model of migration, which separates migrant sending from receiving areas or push factors of out-migration from pull factors of immigration. The novelty of the concept thus lies in reversing the “classic” assimilation/integration policies of migration (Schmitter-Heisler 2008). Instead, codevelopment replaces this model with the theory of migrant transnationalism, which conceptualizes the migrant as a “go-between” between identities, cultures, societies, spaces, and markets (Brettell 2008: 120). The migrant is conceived as an “agent of change” and the process of migration is viewed as “deterritorialized” from nation states. Codevelopment thus introduces a type of mutual collaboration that goes beyond the state-centric, North-South transfers of development aid disbursed within the strict confines of intergovernmental cooperation (Ndione and Bröekhuis 2006:14–15). Because codevelopment policy conceptualizes a cosmopolitan concept of migration, it also promotes circular migration.

Even if fiscal incentives and circular migration have been added to the menu of co-development actions, for the time being, the mainstay of co-development action is financial assistance for strengthening preexisting transnational migrant networks. This is no different for France, which is considered the first country to incorporate codevelopment strategies into overseas development assistance policy (Bräutigam 2010:12).2 According to the French concept of “codevelopment,” any type of development assistance involving the participation of immigrants living in France is considered, regardless of the

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2 In 2007, France was the fourth-largest donor of official development assistance, after the United States, which provided US$7.6 billion; the World Bank, which provided US$6.9 billion; and the European Commission, which provided US$5.4 billion.
type of contribution, which the migrant individually or collectively is offering.³

In addition to its external migration policy dimension, co-development, at least in the French vernacular, seeks to remove internal incoherencies in migration policy formulation. Pursuant to the so-called “whole of government approach,” France draws on the concept to mainstream migration into other policy areas, such as foreign affairs, development and most recently, security. This internal policy rationale pursues an external objective, the one of unifying the French negotiating position vis-à-vis migrant source countries.⁴

And, like most migrant host countries, France is searching for innovative ways to draw on the financial resources and human capital of migrants in order to decrease public spending on official development assistance. Among countries in Europe, France has been particularly innovative in identifying policies to empower migrants—both individually and collectively—to contribute to the development of their countries of origin, including through fiscal incentives and circular migration.

Nonetheless, French co-development policy suffered a range of setbacks, which only but reflect the way global migration trends have responded to the desirability of a migration development linkage in the first place (Sørensen and Van Haer 2003). The varying degree to which funding was allocated to codevelopment over time was not only politically motivated but were also driven by inconclusive research results. Some had found that development in the source country would decrease migration pressure, while others found that once the country of origin attains higher levels of development, emigration will increase rather than slow down. This was shown to be the case with Tunisia, where a higher level of development, not least a free trade agreement with the European Union (EU), contributed to much higher numbers of emigration than in the Sub-Saharan African context, particularly compared to Congolese or Senegalese arrivals in France (Stark and Wang, 2002; Tasca 2008:13). In addition, the amount of trust that French codevelopment policies had invested in immigrant associations, source-country governments, and migrants themselves, varied over time. Such political ambivalence affected the overall credibility of France’s development aid (de Haas 2008:1314; Khoudour-Castéras 2009). It was one of the factors responsible for the limited practical success of the concept (de Haas 2006:69


⁴ The “whole-of-government approach” seeks to create synergies among the different departments and ministries within a government, so as to integrate all policies with a potential migratory impact. It was proposed by the guidelines of the International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM) and the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) Final Report.
with reference to Lacroix 2003:299–300), whereas the following three were equally determinating.

First, and despite being officially driven by “a desire to address the internal and external aspects of these policies within a systematic and coherent manner” (OECD 2008a:34), reality shows that not all migrants can be treated equally; some have managerial and entrepreneurial abilities that others may not have.

Second, there is a directional ambiguity within French co-development policy in terms of the type of contribution or transfer, which government policy should encourage: is it migrants’ intangible contributions, such as transmissions of skills and knowledge acquired or improved, networks established abroad, but also tangible contributions, such as remittances or a migrant’s physical return? Whereas the latter had been the stated priority of France’s immigration and co-development policy, physical return today no longer figures as the unique goal. Instead, co-development encourages development-at-a-distance, and thus tangible and intangible transfers by also by those migrants who permanently remain abroad. Nonetheless, this position may not necessarily reflect broader French immigration policy.

Third, France failed to factor in the long- and short-term effects of development aid. For a long time, it was also not receptive to the fact that return migration is anathema to the positive attitude that source countries harbor toward emigration and the negative attitude they display toward return migrants, even their own citizens (Olesen 2002:127,137). In sum, French migration policy was often guided by the idea that stimulating return migration would increase source-country development and reduce the push factors of migration. Together these factors accounted for a certain measure of inconsistency in French migration and development policy formulation and for the varying degrees of intensity with which France aligned development to migration policies (Khoudour-Castéras 2009). Reflecting such inconsistencies, the concept of codevelopment over time acquired and shed again a variety of facets.

While criticism voiced by the diaspora eventually led France to decouple development aid from return migration in the 1980s, another major shift in the concept of codevelopment came about with France’s 2006–07 immigration law reform, which considerably changed France’s codevelopment strategy, ministerial responsibilities, and funding schemes. Two French laws are at the forefront of the reform—Law No. 2006-911 of July 24, 2006, relating to immigration and integration, which modifies the French code on entry and admission of foreigners and the right to asylum; and Law No. 2007-1613 of November 20, 2007, relating to the management of immigration, integration, and asylum, which creates the codevelopment savings account.
Both laws move France’s immigration policy away from migration based on family reunification to a system of selective labor migration (“immigration choice”). In addition, during the reform, France designed migration pacts to coordinate migration management. The pacts are currently in the process of being concluded with francophone migrant-sending countries, primarily in West and North Africa. These efforts have renewed the concept of codevelopment, a pillar of French migration policy since the 1970s. Codevelopment was, for the first time, firmly positioned in legally binding laws, a fact that contributes to the concept’s visibility and enhances its predictability, transparency, and responsibility. Another main change is to formally bind the migrant-sending countries to the concept of codevelopment. An additional paradigm shift is to move away from funding migrants’ collective investments and instead to reward individual migrants in France for productively investing savings in their country of origin.

2. The Evolution of Codevelopment Policy

As a multistakeholder strategy, the concept of codevelopment relies on “preferential” partners for its implementation5—so-called “development actors” (Connan 2005:1)—which can be decentralized government entities (municipalities, districts, cities, departments, and regions), international or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), other nonstate actors and, most important, migrants themselves. In doing so, codevelopment reaffirms a phenomenon that is as old as migration itself: immigrants, foremost those leaving for work abroad, have always supported, individually or collectively, their communities of origin (Ndione and Bröekhuis 2006:14–15).

This section identifies four phases of French codevelopment policies by describing how French codevelopment policies evolved from:

- Assisting with the integration of migrants, to
- Encouraging migrants to leave, to
- Providing aid with the goal of reducing migratory pressures, or, possibly
- Cofinancing diaspora contributions to public goods in countries of origin.


Initially, the concept of codevelopment included initiatives to facilitate the integration of migrants in France. Later, the Ministry of the Interior used codevelopment to mobilize migrants nearing the end of their lawful stay in

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5 Article 2 of the France-Senegal Co-development Convention.
France to return home voluntarily (1970–86). In 1977, France, following the example of Germany (1972) and the Netherlands (1975), started experimenting with granting financial “bonuses” to migrants returning to their countries of origin with a business plan (Wihtol de Wenden 2008:2; Terrot 2009:17). Eligibility for codevelopment financing was then expanded to those diaspora organizations in France that agreed to identify their compatriots staying in France unlawfully (Wihtol de Wenden 2008:2). Codevelopment thus became a sort of “compensation” offered by France to those diaspora organizations that agreed to identify their nationals on illegal stays in France. The diaspora thus was tasked with acting on behalf of its uncooperative government, which most often refused to identify its citizens. Codevelopment’s policy objective was to delegate governmental functions to a nongovernmental entity, the diasporas in France, which were then rewarded for cooperating with France, the host country government, in combating irregular migration.

Not surprisingly, this use of codevelopment funds was severely criticized by members of the diaspora. Between 1983 and 1993, the “political discourse abandoned the explicit link to return policies and emphasized development aid as a factor to reduce migratory pressure” (de Haas 2006:67, but see Khoudour-Castéras 2009). France began consultations to seek input from development-oriented actors, even if diaspora associations were not yet systematically interviewed. Around this time, France also experimented with projects of decentralized government cooperation, the Local Migration Development Programme (Programme d’aide à la reinstallation) in the region of Kayes (Mali), which was a main point of departure for France (Lacroix 2009:9). Migrants planning to return to a job; those engaged in a creative project; or those ready to establish small-scale economic activity in the fields of agriculture, commerce, or handicrafts, could receive financial assistance in addition to the return and reintegration funds, which the various National Agencies for the Admission of Migrants (Agence Nationale de l’Accueil des Etrangers et des Migrations) operating in francophone migrant source countries, like Mali, Senegal, and Tunisia, were disbursing to help pay for their return to their country of origin.6

6 In 2009, the National Agency for the Admission of Migrants (http://www.anaem.fr/article.php3?id_article=490) was replaced by the Bureau for Immigration and Integration (Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration) (www.ofii.fr), created by Decree No.2009-331 of April 2009, to administer the requests for professional migration, family reunification, integration, return, and reintegration support. The OFII’s head office is in Paris, but it has regional representations in France and abroad. Those abroad are in countries with close ties to France: Cameroon, Canada, Mali, Morocco, Romania, Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkey, but also territories such as Guiana, Guadeloupe, La Réunion, Martinique, and St. Martin.

7 Reintegration aid can be defined as “start-up assistance for business or economic activity with the purpose of supporting the economic initiatives of migrants in their countries of origin” (EMN 2010:36); see also Article 3, para. c) of the Convention on Co-Development between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of Senegal, of May 25, 2000, United Nations Treaty Series Volume 2129, I-37100.
For the project to be eligible for cofinancing, the French Government would carry out a feasibility study to assess the merits of the project. Once the project is up and running, it is closely monitored for a year.\textsuperscript{8} Even if, officially, codevelopment financing was no longer conditional upon voluntary return, indirectly the linkage remained, because only those migrants were eligible who also qualified for assisted and voluntary return and reintegration funding. During that time, France multiplied its efforts to negotiate agreements on the vocational and professional training for Algerian and Senegalese migrants wishing to return to a job in their home countries.\textsuperscript{9} These agreements were not officially concluded as part of the French codevelopment policies. A certain level of incoherence thus emerged between migrants receiving training for return and those qualifying as recipients of codevelopment. For example, most Senegalese applying for French codevelopment funding have completed tertiary education but then often lacked the entrepreneurial, managerial, and marketing skills and tools to succeed with their export/import enterprises or consultancy projects, which codevelopment was funding (CICI 2009:195–6).

\textbf{2.2 The Pasqua Laws of 1993 and the Tightening of French Migration Policies}

As a result of the right-wing Pasqua laws of 1993, the Interministerial Mission for Codevelopment and International Migrations (Mission interministérielle au co-développement et aux migrations internationales) was created and was tasked with tightening return policies. Stricter surveillance of return aid and reintegration support was instituted because of the infamously “lost” 1 million French francs of Lionel Stoléru, the State Secretary of Immigration and Manual Work in France in 1977, who initiated return policies under the motto of “Leaving to stay” (“partir pour rester”) by providing migrants willing to go home with the cash to do so (Wihtol de Wenden 2008:2). The Mission on Migration and Co-development in 1998 devised a broad-based financial aid and reintegration support system to create incentives for undocumented migrants from Mali, Morocco, and Senegal who were not eligible for amnesties, to voluntarily return home (OECD 2008a:30).

What came to be known as Contracts of Reinsertion in the Country of Origin (Contrats de Réinsertion dans le Pays d’Origine, CRPO) was initiated, whereby a migrant signs a contract with France that requires him or her to

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\textsuperscript{8} France, \url{http://www.co-developpement.org/}.

\textsuperscript{9} The “Agreement on Training for Workers Who Have Temporarily Emigrated to France with a View to Their Return to Senegal and Their Integration into the Senegalese Economy,” signed at Dakar on December 1, 1980, came into force on August 1, 1982 (United Nations Treaty Series Volume 1306, I-21788). In 1980, France and Senegal had already concluded an agreement on what today would be called “voluntary return.” It provided for French Government support to the professional development of Senegalese in France to prepare them for their return to Senegal.
return to the home country. In return, the migrant obtains financial aid, the so-called return and reintegration support, and often training to prepare for his or her return to a job in Senegal, particularly in the catering, food, and transport industries (Ndione and Bröekhuis 2006:17). CRPO funding targets migrants who either had entered France with falsified entry visas and identities or who had overstayed their residency permit and were thus in unauthorized stays in France and who, pursuant to French immigration law, were being mobilized to return home voluntarily. Unrealistic goals and a credibility gap left the CRPO, like previous financial reward schemes of the 1970s and 1980s, with unsatisfactory results. In addition, the financial resources allocated to codevelopment projects were modest (compared to remittances transfers), and the training programs for employment upon return were inadequately tailored to the employment prospects in the home countries. The result was a low number of applicants for these schemes. The credibility of codevelopment further suffered because return and reintegration funds were often used by the migrants for other purposes, such as purchasing luxury goods (Terrot 2009:17).

In the late 1990s, France reorganized diaspora associations and sought to integrate them under an umbrella organization called the Organizations of International Solidarity for Migration (Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations, OSIM) (Lacroix 2009:10). In 2001, Charles Josselin, then-Minister of Cooperation and Francophone Countries, established the Forum of Organizations of International Solidarity Issued from Migration (Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale Issues des Migrations), which is a platform reuniting the different OSIMs.

The Forum is the result of the second series of consultations that the French Government conducted with members of the diaspora and other non-state actors engaged in migration in light of the limited success of return and reintegration support schemes (Lacroix 2009:10). Unlike the OSIMs, which are for the most part regionally organized, the Forum of Organizations of International Solidarity Issued from Migration brings together not only the various OSIMs, but also links them up with government representatives and associations working on development assistance.

The OSIMs’ mandate is to report on the development actions in home countries and in France, and to initiate programs to foster better integration in France. They also play an important role in managing diaspora-led development initiatives outside the formal cofunding schemes. By officially entering into dialogue with members of the diaspora, France had pioneered a new type of migration-development nexus, which still qualifies as an

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10 Forum of Organisations of International Solidarity Issued from Migration; www.forim.net.
Innovative move in migration policy formulation in Europe today (de Haas 2006:68).

In response to OSIM’s request, France added cofunding of diaspora projects to the menu of codevelopment. France would cofund diaspora-led investments in local development projects in home countries and conduct feasibility studies to find project partners. In-kind support included mentoring programs with French business for return migrants wanting to create small and medium enterprises in countries of origin. De Haas (2006:79–80) and Lacroix (2009:14–15) argue that involving diaspora members in return strategies was the only way France could ensure that its immigration laws would be upheld.

When France concluded a codevelopment convention with Senegal on May 25, 2000, which was updated by a complementary cofunding convention of February 3, 2005 (Tasca 2008:36), the link between codevelopment and migration control and return policies again resurfaced in French migration policies. For example, Article 1 of France’s codevelopment convention with Senegal, which lists the “purposes” of codevelopment, omits to mention assisted and voluntary return and reintegration support. Only Article 4 on the “joint control of migration flows,” mentions return and reintegration support, thus associating the latter type of aid with migration control and the fight against irregular migration. The existence of this “hidden” return and forced repatriation agenda in a codevelopment convention, the primary purpose of which was to strengthen source country development, was heavily criticized. Critics, among which were the OSIM and the source country governments, claimed that codevelopment, which is a means of ex-ante migration management, should be kept separate from measures of ex-post migration control, such as return and reintegration support. By mixing the two policies, the purpose of codevelopment was being diverted or at worst abused to achieve restrictive immigration policies (Courtin 2007:393–408).

Unsurprisingly, source countries, like Mali and Senegal, stiffly resisted efforts to condition codevelopment aid on taking back citizens who had been on irregular stays in France but who did not wish to return home (de Haas 2006:70). Thus, France did not succeed in negotiating codevelopment conventions with other African countries beyond Senegal, as it had hoped to do. On the other hand, Mali and Senegal left France with no other choice than to use codevelopment funds to get their governments, which otherwise refused to take back their citizens in unlawful stays in France (Aleinikoff 2003:1–27; Noll 2003:S.61–74,67), to comply with this customary international obligation (Groff 2005:2).

11 Article 3, para. c) of the France-Senegal Co-development Convention.
2.3 Shifting Ministerial Competencies and the Redesign of Codevelopment (2002–06)

In reaction to criticism by members of the diaspora, migration control and prevention were officially kept separate from codevelopment strategies. Thus, in 2002, the Interministerial Mission for Codevelopment and International Migrations was dissolved because it was widely held that the CRPO had failed. It was replaced by a Minister-delegate for Cooperation and Francophonie, who was tasked with implementing the codevelopment programs and reporting directly to the Ministry of the Interior (de Haas 2006:70). First, the CRPO was reformed so that it no longer offered only financial sponsorship but also EU Schengen visas to reward migrants who signed those contracts, which required the migrant to leave for his or her home country by the end of his or her legal stay. France had implemented these measures under pressure from EU neighboring countries, which were opposed to France engaging in mass regularizations the purpose of which would have been to give resident status to all migrants in unlawful stays in France (Ndione and Bröekhuis 2006:17).

In 2003, the responsibilities for codevelopment shifted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which alone became entrusted with the codevelopment portfolio. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs redefined codevelopment as assisting migrants who, individually or collectively, act as agents of development of their home countries (Adebusoye 2006:16–19). Primarily, codevelopment funding seeks collective investments by migrants. It also relies on matching funds from NGOs, international organizations, immigration associations, local (source country) communities, the private sector, and other governments, as long as a project is related to migration. Institutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “formalized” codevelopment funding, by establishing transparent selection criteria and embedding codevelopment into France’s Framework Partnership Documents, which centrally disbursed the funds as one part of Priority Solidarity Funding (PSF). PSF is development assistance granted over renewable two-year periods12 and is a prioritized credit line in France’s Framework Partnership Documents, which France signs with countries of the priority solidarity zone.13

These memorandums of understanding, which France signs with countries of its priority solidarity zone, determine whether a country qualifies for the disbursement of development assistance. The Framework Partnership Documents, which embed the PSF development aid programs, are signed with countries in the so-called priority solidarity zone encompassing former French

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13 Ibid.
colonies. Despite its seeming complexity, this setup allows maximum flexibility to directly involve the diaspora community by circumventing the source-country government; the Framework Partnership Document earmarks the funding, and there is no need for France to conclude an additional agreement or convention on codevelopment projects with the source-country government.\textsuperscript{14} PSF development assistance matches up to 25 percent of any public or private investment or transfer made by the diaspora community collectively or by an NGO in a country of origin.

Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and until the immigration law reform of 2006–07, France’s codevelopment policy was mainly applied to Mali and Senegal, with a few select actions and smaller-scale codevelopment projects targeting the Comoros (Martin, Martin, and Weil 2002:236). Between 2002 and 2008, all 28 countries forming part of France’s priority solidarity zone became eligible for multilateral codevelopment funding, just as they also qualified for higher levels of return and reintegration support than countries outside that zone.

Cofunding is not unique to France. At least one migrant-sending country, Mexico, also operates a cofunding scheme. Whereas in the case of France it is the host country that provides the matching funds, in the case of Mexico’s 3x1 Program, Mexico provides the funds. The Mexican State of Zacatecas, and other Mexican States, match migrants’ investments in their home countries (de la Garza and Hazan 2003; Hazan 2009). France’s concept of codevelopment not only relies on the diaspora, but also on other partners to contribute. In France’s codevelopment programs with Mali (2001) and with Senegal (2005), 29 percent of the codevelopment funds were financed by migrants, 63 percent by France, and 8 percent by other partners (AFD 2006). For 2009, the diaspora in France financed up to €3.3 million worth of projects in Senegal. In the spirit of the Mexican 3x1 program, Senegal is one of the few African governments to match the French funding (of €9 million for three years starting in 2009) with €0.57 million (CICI 2009:195–96). Unlike other African governments, Senegalese authorities have taken an active role in policy formulation in the field of migration and development by establishing a joint Franco-Senegalese review committee to monitor the actions funded and to sketch out the strategic direction of the projects.

Despite encouraging signs, codevelopment funding in France turned out to be a mixed success because it was too tightly conditioned on the migrant’s voluntary return (Courtin 2007:393). Most collective investments by members of the diaspora were found to fund infrastructure of public buildings, such as schools, hospitals, dams (for retaining water to produce electricity), and

renovation of water distribution systems. Of the 123 projects established between 2003 and 2005 in the framework of codevelopment with Mali, 60 percent have achieved sustainability, 20 percent were unsustainable, and 20 percent were dropped. On average, each enterprise generated two jobs (de Haas 2006:76). In terms of numbers of migrants taking advantage of the program, PSF project cofunding proved to be not very effective (OECD 2008b:192). In 2002, only 46 migrants returning from France to Mali applied for codevelopment project funding (Diatta 2008:129).

In 2004, a program was launched to channel migrant remittances flows into productive investments and awareness-raising cultural programs for linking second-generation migrants to their country of origin (de Haas 2006:70). In the case of Senegal, reintegration support was stepped up with more tailored programs such as the “Programme for Assisting Migrant Projects in Senegal” (Articles 3 and 4 of the France-Senegal Codevelopment Convention of 2001. In this context, France and Senegal jointly established an Office of Reception, Orientation and Follow-up of Actions for the Reinsertion of Emigrants (Bureau d’Accueil, d’Orientation et de Suivi des Actions de Réinsertion des Émigrés), to provide institutional capacity for managing the reintegration of migrants. Because of “administrative deficiencies, insufficient funding and migrants’ lack of confidence in the organization,” the bureau has not been used very much (Gerdes 2007:3–4).

Training-for-return and socioeconomic reintegration in the agriculture and health sectors was also provided for. The first multiple-entry visas were issued; in contrast with the current circular visas, these early schemes were limited to return migrants employed under the auspices of a local migration development program. Whereas codevelopment during that time never lost its underlying goal of migration control, it had improved the balance between source- and host-country interests with respect to migration. However, the concept of codevelopment despite new trends still enjoyed only limited visibility.

2.4 From Codevelopment to Solidarity Development in Sarkozy’s Immigration Law Reform of 2006–07

Codevelopment experienced yet another turnaround under France’s Immigration and Integration Law of 2006, proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy when he was Minister of the Interior. When Sarkozy acceded to the French presidency, he created a special ministry in 2007, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development (Ministère de

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15 National Agencies for the Admission of Migrants; http://www.anaem.fr/article.php3?id_article=532.
16 Article 4 of the France-Senegal Co-development Convention.
l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire, MIIINDS). By decree of March 18, 2008, a new tool labeled “solidarity development” was designed to remedy some of the shortcomings of the traditional cofunding facility (de Haas 2206:80). Solidarity development financially supports educational, vocational, and professional training for specific sectors in the source country, such as agriculture, fishery, and health (Tasca 2008:19). It is government-to-government funding of development initiatives with an emphasis on reducing migratory root causes, like unemployment. Unlike codevelopment funding, which is directly disbursed to private parties, that is, to diaspora members, solidarity development qualifies as structural aid, meaning the type of development aid that is directly granted to a government in a long-term effort, as opposed to short-term disaster relief or humanitarian aid. Structural aid is also different from individualized return and reintegration support and cofunding of diaspora projects, since the latter two types of aid circumvent the partner country’s government by being directly disbursed to either an individual or a collectivity. Much of solidarity development aid is disbursed as “decentralized government cooperation” with the goal of retaining and upgrading skills in regions with heavy out-migration. It requires the “twinning” of local governments in France and in the migrant source country. Cities, provinces, but also universities, education and research institutes, and migrant source countries could be twinned. Such decentralized development cooperation complements France’s codevelopment assistance to diaspora projects.

Institutionally, responsibilities for development aid for migration are split between the MIIINDS, which funds solidarity development, that is, structural development aid, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which remains responsible for codevelopment assistance to the diaspora.¹⁸ According to Wihtol de Wenden (2008:8), there are three reasons for this split:

- The failure of codevelopment to stimulate more entrepreneurial activity by the diaspora community
- The shallow volume of funds reserved for codevelopment (roughly €3 million)
- The low number of countries to which codevelopment was applied.

Some concern over the split responsibilities has been voiced because the interministerial tug-of-war over the proper allocation of migration and development issues institutionally undermined the concept of codevelopment and the overall coherence of migration policy. For example, as of November 2010, the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)

is under the shared management of the Ministry of Immigration, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Economy. To avoid the risk of the Ministry of Immigration taking some of the development responsibilities away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a report issued by the French National Assembly has called on the new Ministry to avoid acting in an isolated manner and to ensure that the new pacts on concerted migration management expressly refer to the Framework Partnership Documents, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concludes with those same countries (Terrot 2009:33).

One positive effect of the split ministerial responsibility over codevelopment, however, is that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs freed additional resources for sectoral funding schemes in health, education, and banking. Financial return and reintegration assistance to low-skilled or non-formally skilled migrants who return to a job or to small-scale economic activity in agriculture, commerce, or handicrafts was retained.\(^{19}\) Even if never stated explicitly, the implicit goal of codevelopment remains a security-driven one of controlling migration flows (de Haas 2008:1314). Nonetheless, with the ministerial reallocation, codevelopment gained visibility, not least because the concept was integrated into France’s new bilateral agreements on migration, which the MIINDS had designed as a by-product of the immigration law reform it had undertaken in 2006–07, as discussed below.

Together, solidarity and codevelopment have twin goals: (a) channeling individual migrants’ savings to productive investments, and (b) mobilizing the diaspora community to contribute financially and through the transfer of know-how to the socioeconomic development of their countries of origin.

Five actions are designed to achieve these goals (Tosca 2008:33):

- **Supporting local development in zones of high out-migration** (decentralized development). Such support can occur directly via development aid or indirectly via matching, by government funding, the contributions of the diaspora community in terms of the tangible and intangible transfer of resources to local development in their countries of origin to mobilize migrants settled in France (targeting mostly the diaspora elite).
- **Contributing to the human capital development of their countries of origin by virtual or physical return of competencies, skills, and expertise.** Circular migration for professional education and expert missions to their home countries by highly skilled members of the diaspora community is facilitated.

\(^{19}\) Article 3, para. b) of the France-Senegal Co-Development Convention.
• Encouraging productive investments by migrants in their home communities (education, infrastructure, and essential services) and their entrepreneurship, whether or not the migrant returns.

• Decreasing the costs of transferring remittances and offering tax breaks for productive savings.

• Improving the integration of young persons with a migratory background to find work either in the host country or in their home country. This is a more recent goal, included since 2006, with the advent of the new migration pacts.20

Furthermore, in 2009, eligibility for multilateral codevelopment funding and reintegration support was narrowed to only those priority solidarity zone countries that have “large communities living in France and the degree of organization of these communities in France, as well as the willingness shown by the governments of those countries to associate their communities living abroad with their own development policies” (EMN 2010:26). Thus, priority countries benefiting from support today are Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Surinam, Togo, Tunisia, and Vietnam.

As regards reintegration support, the tightening occurred because reintegration aid often had the opposite effect from the one desired. Instead of mobilizing migrants to return and open a business, the reintegration support, which in Mali was up to €4,000 per migrant, triggered “me-too” actions whereby Malian citizens would follow the example of their fellow citizens and attempt to migrate to France simply to become eligible for this type of aid. Thus, individualized return and reintegration support has been found to increase, rather than decrease, migratory pressure (Martinez 2009:50–51). However, the amounts of reintegration support available for the individual migrant (€4,000 to €7,000 per project in 2009) are not higher if a country has signed a pact with France (Martinez 2009:50). Inversely, eligibility for additional, bilateral codevelopment funding (not reintegration aid), was now limited to countries that sign a bilateral migration pact with France (see section below).

Solidarity development and codevelopment were also incorporated into France’s migration pacts, where they form the third component of such a pact. In a migration pact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will fund the diaspora

initiatives incorporated into a pact, such as evidenced by Articles 22:6 and 22:7 of France’s pact with Benin (Terrot 2009:33), even if the overall responsibility for the pact falls under the responsibility of the Immigration Ministry (which, since November 2010, has been downsized to a government agency operating within the Ministry of the Interior).

In 2008, the French Parliament authorized €30 million for codevelopment activities. In the same year, Sub-Saharan and North African migrants in France sent €8 billion to their home countries (Martinez 2009:57). First results of bilateral cofinancing obtained for Senegal on December 31, 2008, show that of the 197 projects supported by 15 development operators (agencies, NGOs, public-private partnerships), 52 percent remain in an active phase of implementation and have generated investments of up to €130 million, with employment created for up to 800 individuals; yet up to 56 percent of the projects remain centered in the urban zone of Dakar (CICI 2009:196).

In 2009, the MIIINDS devoted €69 million to subsidize solidarity development initiatives (MIIINDS 2009). PSF contributed up to €2.5 million in matching funds for 182 projects in Mali during 2006–08. In comparison, Malians in France in 2005 sent €295 million in officially and unofficially recorded remittances (AfDB 2007:12).

NGOs like the Water Solidarity Network (Programme solidarité eau, pS-Eau), jointly run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Euroresources, and France’s PSF, offer technical support to migrant communities that wish to apply for codevelopment funding. To be eligible, migrants must carry at least 30 percent of the project costs, the project must be in line with the local development plan, and a feasibility study has to be conducted. Projects can expect to receive between €7,500 and €45,700.

The pS-Eau in Senegal has been somewhat successful at channeling investments into the country, and today it runs all codevelopment projects there.

3. Financial Repackaging: Codevelopment in France’s 2006–07 Immigration Law

Collective cofunding generated limited economic impact, because participation remained shallow. In reaction, Sarkozy’s immigration law reform (2006–07) designed new codevelopment tools that financially repositioned the concept. Tax breaks and a codevelopment prize created in 2008 (see “Codevelopment Prize” subsection below) equip codevelopment

22 Euroresources; http://www.euroresources.org/guide_to_population_assistance/france/co_development_initiatives.html
with real-time enforcement mechanisms. Sarkozy’s tools focused much more on mobilizing the individual migrant. For the first time in its 30-year history, the immigration law reform translated codevelopment into legal text and thus strengthened its visibility, since previously the government was carrying out a policy that had no legal sanction. Two French ministerial decrees have added flexibility to the codevelopment strategy. The MIIINDS, together with other relevant ministries, is empowered to conclude public-private partnerships with a bank, which then offers tax breaks through a special “codevelopment savings account” or “bank passbook” to the individual migrant in France, who invests his or her savings profitably in his or her source country. By defiscalizing those migrants’ savings, which are invested profitably in the migrants’ countries of origin, France individualized and “bancarized” codevelopment aid. The advantage of development aid being disbursed not in kind but in the form of tax breaks on migrants’ individual savings is that it costs less for the French Government in terms of administration, all while increasing the revenue for commercial banks in the form of interest rates (Crayen, Hainz, and Ströh de Martínez 2010:3).

3.1. Defiscalization of Migrants’ Productive Investments

France has broken new ground for European migration policies by defiscalizing migrants’ savings. Defiscalization is a term French codevelopment policies use to label tax exemptions provided with the purpose of stimulating investments in the country of origin. Today, there are two initiatives for encouraging migrants in France to put their savings into the formal banking system: the codevelopment savings account and the codevelopment bank passbook. Both of these initiatives, if well managed, could result in a threefold gain: (a) migrants obtain a tax break, (b) French banks obtain the migrants’ funds as fresh capital, and (c) the French Government, which concludes agreements with retail banks in the country of origin, encourages these banks to cooperate with French banks, while saving itself the cost of transferring development aid. The bancarization strategy, whereby commercial banks are authorized by the French Government to grant tax breaks on migrant savings, also stimulates retail banking as a source of employment in developing countries.

Defiscalization encourages migrants to use formal channels for transferring funds, thereby encourages the “bancarization” of savings and transfers. This, in turn, discourages the use of money transfer companies, which in West Africa handle 70 percent of official payments (IFAD 2008), or reliance on the informal “Fax” system, predominant in the Comoros, Mali, and Senegal, where it is based on the Hawala “banking” tradition of mutual trust (AfDB 2007:30).24

24 For instance, Senegal’s migrants are increasingly using formal methods (45 percent still rely on informal methods, but in 2003, the number was over 60 percent).
French Law No. 1631 of November 20, 2007, on controlling immigration, integration, and asylum (Article L 221-33), laid the foundation for the Prime Minister to decree on February 19, 2007, the establishment of a codevelopment savings account. The codevelopment savings account receives savings destined to an economic investment in a migrant’s country of origin from migrants who are from one of the 50 developing countries listed as eligible recipients in a decree jointly issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Economics, and the Minister of the Interior. Based on the decree of February 19, 2007, France would first sign public-private partnership agreements with banks, credit unions, and other financial establishments with the view of encouraging them to make available the codevelopment savings account. Based on that decree and its 2008 migration pact with Tunisia, France that year signed its first public-private partnership with the Union of Tunisian Banks (Terrot 2009:21).25

Eligibility for the codevelopment savings account is limited to migrants who hold a permit of stay valid for engaging in professional activity in France. These migrants may invest up to 25 percent of their savings, but not more than the annual ceiling of €20,000, into predefined projects, which then benefit from tax reductions of up to 40 percent of the total sum put into the savings account between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2011. The minimum amount of the account is €50 and the maximum is capped at €50,000 per person. The duration of the account is limited to six years.26

To date, France’s codevelopment savings account has not been used very much, because it is restricted to migrants engaging in a professional activity in France, a fact that reduces the scope of eligible persons to holders of the one-year temporary permit of stay. To make the savings scheme available to a wider circle of migrants in France, the Prime Minister, on June 28, 2008, decreed the creation of a codevelopment bank passbook.27 Eligibility has been widened to any person lawfully entitled to stay in France, regardless of whether the migrant is gainfully employed or practices a profession in the country. Under the decree, foreigners with a residency limit (valid up to 10 years) became a new target group, but investments defiscalized through the bank passbook were limited to those made in countries with which France has concluded a new pact on migration management.28 Only migrants keeping a certain level of savings in their account can get a loan, and only after a minimum savings period of three years.

27 Article R221-117 of the Monetary and Financial Code of France.
28 See Article 22:4 of the Benin-France pact, Article 5 of the Senegal-France pact, and Article 5:3 of the Congo-France pact.
Unlike the cofunding of collective investments, such fiscal incentives (and penalties) engage the personal responsibility of the migrant. That 96 percent of migrants in France have a bank account, which is close to the national median (of 98 percent), is evidence of this. Thus, of 4.9 million immigrants living in France (in 2006), only 200,000 fell outside the formal banking system due to scarcity of resources or to their recent arrival in the country (Milhaud 2006:7).

Roughly 40 percent (and for Sub-Saharan Africa, roughly 75 percent) of the immigrants in France send money back home. On a long-term basis, these transfers represent from 15 to 25 percent of the migrants’ revenue and, depending on the recipient country, from 10 to 20 percent of the state budget (Martinez 2009:57). Yet, 75 percent of these transfers to migrant source countries flow to health expenditures and consumables instead of contributing to the development of the local economy. Even if French policies did not want to interfere with a migrant’s freedom of choice, the codevelopment savings account and bank passbook are incentives to encourage more investments into collective equipment, infrastructure, and entrepreneurial projects (Milhaud 2006:9).

3.2 Reducing the Costs of Remittances Transfers

France is the world’s 12th-highest remittances-sending country (World Bank 2008:14). Like other host countries, it aims to lower the transfer costs of remittances, since remittances can contribute to source-country development (Martin and Abella 2009:432). Remittances are often described as the “easiest” transmission mechanism between migration and development, yet only 40 to 60 percent of the North and West African Diaspora in France remit compared to 70 to 80 percent of migrants remitting from other corridors (Ndione and Bröekhuis 2006). Not only is there potential to increase the amount of remittances transferred to Africa, but also to reduce the costs, which can be up to 25 percent of the amount sent and are thus significantly higher compared to other regions (IFAD 2009:2).

To that end, the French Development Agency established in 2007 an online fee-comparison tool29 that compares what various financial and informal institutes charge for sending remittances back home. Most new pacts refer to that fee-comparison tool.30 On October 23, 2009, the MIIINDS, together with the African Development Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, signed a convention to launch a “multilateral solidarity development fund” for Africa. Its primary objective is to decrease the costs of migrants’ transfers in accordance with the strategy of the G-8 July 2009

30 Article 22:3 of the Benin-France pact, Article 6:3(2) of the Senegal-France pact, and Article 5:2 of the Congo-France pact.
meeting, to achieve a 50 percent reduction in the costs of transfers by 2014. The Fund, toward which France contributes €6 million, will also design new financial tools, to encourage migrants’ savings and investments in their countries of origin. This multilateral fund will also cofinance, in the spirit of codevelopment, investments in the development of entrepreneurship in countries of origin, prioritizing calls for microcredit loans and support to small and medium enterprises (MIIINDS 2009).

3.3 Codevelopment Prize

France’s Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development, Brice Hortefeux, on June 16, 2008, created a €3,000 Integration and Codevelopment Prize to be awarded annually to individuals or immigrant associations that have contributed to codevelopment of their countries of origin while they remain in France (de Haas 2006:70; IOM 2005:41) citing the Adviser to the Ambassador in charge of codevelopment, France). The prize is given to:

- Migrants living in France or those who have benefited from return and reintegration support of the National Agencies for the Admission of Migrants31 who have created an enterprise or engaged in activities generating resources and employment opportunities in their countries of origin
- An exemplary model of decentralized development cooperation in the region of origin that is being cofunded by an association of migrants, the OSIM.32

Besides the €3,000, which is granted to the individual migrant or the collectivity, the codevelopment project itself is also honored and can be awarded up to €12,000.33 A committee comprising representatives from the Ministry of Immigration and successful migrants, including sportsmen, writers, and entrepreneurs,34 (although limited so far to permanent migrants residing in France), will disburse the prizes. In 2009, the prizes were awarded to projects that created a textile industry in Dakar; a pharmacy in Bamako, Mali; and a fish farm in Keur Momar Sarr in Senegal. All the projects were established by return migrants. The diaspora organization in France of the

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31 Renamed in 2009 the Office of Immigration and Integration.
towship of Gambi Diaobé was honored for constructing a hydroelectric dam in their village in Senegal.35

To summarize, French migration policy provides five instruments to incentivize migrants to invest their savings in their home countries: (a) the savings account, (b) the bank passbook, (c) the cofinancing of collective investments, (d) access to microcredit facilities and support from the new multidonor (African Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and MIIINDS) solidarity development facility, and (e) the codevelopment prize. The next section discusses which of these and other codevelopment programs are specific to the new French migration pacts and thus are conditional on a migrant source country concluding such a bilateral migration agreement with France.

4. Bilateral Codevelopment Strategy in the New French Migration Pacts

Since the conclusion of the French pacts on migration management (Tasca 2008:5; Terot 2009:5), the policy of involving the migrant as an “agent of development,” but also other codevelopment actors, has gained new momentum. France’s pacts were designed by Brice Hortefeux, the first minister of the newly created MIIINDS, in 2007, and are to be concluded with the 28 countries of France’s priority solidarity zone, with priority being given to those migrant source countries that have a considerable number of citizens residing temporarily or permanently in France, primarily Western and Northern Africa.

Of its 15 migration pacts, France has signed nine comprehensive pacts on migration management, as seen in table 2.1. These nine “classic” templates have three chapters that cover (a) the fight against irregular migration, (b) labor migration, and (c) solidarity development. Five of the pacts entered into force between late 2008 and 2010 (Benin, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Tunisia) (see table 2.1) (Tasca 2008: 5).36 At the time of writing, the pacts with Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, and Lebanon had been adopted by the respective national assemblies, but the ratification process had


36 The pacts are publicly available on at least three different sources. Whereas the French Government posts them only once they have been ratified by the French Parliament (http://www.immigration-professionnelle.gouv.fr/textes-de-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rence/accords-bilateraux/acCORD-FRANCE-B%2C%20MIIINDS), two French NGOs, the Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des Evacués (http://www.cimade.org/uploads/File/solidarites-internationales/Documents/accords%20bilat%C3%A9raux/acCORD_SENEGAL.pdf) and the Groupe d’Information et de Soutien des Immigrés (http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?rubrique135) publish the texts once they have been signed, if and when the NGO has succeeded in accessing the texts.
not been finalized by France. Four of the pacts are what this study will label “light” versions, because their scope is limited to stay and circular migration of professionals and solidarity development, but excludes readmission and border securitization measures to combat irregular migration. During 2008–09, France signed such “light” migration pacts with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mauritius, Montenegro, and Serbia. So far, only the pact with Mauritius has entered into force, in September 2010. The pacts with the Western Balkan countries are awaiting ratification by both parties. Two of the pacts—one with Brazil and one with the Russian Federation—could qualify as “super-light” versions, because without chapters on readmissions and solidarity development aid, their only purpose is to facilitate the migration of professionals. The pact with Brazil is a nonbinding administrative arrangement that reads like a declaration of intent to engage in jointly managing each other’s migration and police and security policies (Terrot 2010).

Table 2.1. French Migration Pacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiations</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Ratification</th>
<th>Entry into force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 2007</td>
<td>May 25, 2009</td>
<td>March 1, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Sept. 7, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept. 7, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>May 23, 2009</td>
<td>transmitted by the French National Assembly to the Senate, Dec. 22, 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Nov. 24, 2008</td>
<td>Jan. 3, 2011</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Arab Rep.</td>
<td>since late 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>June 26, 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>since 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>since late 2007 or early 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Nov. 27, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Apr. 28, 2008</td>
<td>May 25, 2009</td>
<td>July 1, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation using data from the MIIINDS “Accords bilatéraux” (cut-off date for data is January 2011).37

37 For updated data, see: http://www.immigration-professionnelle.gouv.fr/nouveaux-dispositifs/accords-bilat%C3%A9raux
Additional pacts—with Algeria, Egypt, and Equatorial Guinea—are under negotiation. Discussions have been held on agreements with Haiti, Mauritania, Morocco, and the Philippines, countries that have signaled an interest in signing such agreements (CIMADE 2009:3; Terrot 2009:5). Negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea have been suspended due to political instability. The agreements under negotiation with non-African countries (Brazil and the Russian Federation, but also with Georgia, India, and Vietnam) are slightly different, because those countries have already signed EU-wide readmission agreements or have far-reaching association, stabilization, or partnership and cooperation agreements with the EU. This means that certain elements, such as readmission obligations or development cooperation, are not reiterated in the bilateral migration pact signed with France.38 No agreement could be reached with Mali, which refused to sign a new pact due to a clash with France over the number of Malians in unlawful stays in France. Mali wanted to have 4,000 to 5,000 of its citizens regularized; France offered to regularize 1,500, despite Mali being the main recipient of French development aid for Africa (Diatta 2008). The pacts complement the French immigration laws of July 24, 2006, and November 20, 2007, in three ways.

First, they were designed to dissipate tensions with former colonies in West Africa, which had been disproportionately affected by the high-skill orientation of France’s new immigration law of July 24, 2006. The pacts are in essence bilateral framework agreements with a trilateral structure composed of three chapters: border security, labor migration and development cooperation, and codevelopment policies. The new pacts thus formally embed codevelopment into the legally binding structure of a bilateral agreement. Unlike in the past, when the French codevelopment funding mechanisms bypassed the host country government in the sense that the funding went directly to an immigrant association, the pacts now commit the country of origin to sharing responsibility for the costs and benefits of implementing codevelopment policies. As codevelopment has moved to the forefront of similar strategies in Europe, it has emerged as a field of research and policy of its own.

Second, in addition to acting as a corrective to the high-skill bias of the 2006 and 2007 immigration laws, the French pacts also keep the French Government from having to regularize through nationwide amnesties the status of migrants in irregular stays. The goal is achieved by incorporating a readmission clause in each pact, which requires the migrant-sending country

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to take back its citizens, and in some cases third-country nationals that have transited through the country, who are in irregular stays in France. This increased security and enforcing of border controls is meant to combat irregular migration by incentivizing the migrant source countries to enforce the customary international law obligation to take back their own citizens, whether they are in lawful or unlawful stays in France and whether or not they return home voluntarily or have to be deported. Pursuant to a majority of international law opinion, any country has, as a matter of territorial sovereignty over its borders, a customary duty to take back its own citizens. From this customary obligation flows the duty to respect another country’s immigration laws, from which flows the duty to cooperate with that other country when it comes to taking back its own citizens who are in irregular stays in the host country, without the need for the host country to “reward” such an action.

Yet, from a strictly human-rights-based approach, which is the approach source countries have been taking, the duty to take back its own citizens only applies to those citizens who return voluntarily. Under this more narrow view, a migrant-sending country would thus have the right to refuse to cooperate in deportations of its own citizens, which the host country seeks to forcefully expel, deport, and repatriate because they have violated immigration laws of that host country. This legally unclear situation has made the conclusion of readmission agreements with source countries difficult. Therefore, many host countries of migrants in Europe have stepped up readmission agreements by offering considerable development aid packages in return for the source country cooperating in readmission procedures (Hailbronner 1996). This paradigm shift has led, since the late 1990s, to the reemergence of bilaterally managed migration relations, mostly at the incentive of EU countries like France, Italy, and Spain, bordering the Mediterranean and securing the “front door” of Europe exposed to Sub-Saharan transit and North African (irregular) migration (Alscher 2005).

For this reason, the French pacts seek to engage the migrant source country more intensely in cooperating on managing migratory flows, but also to make host country governments responsible for migratory root causes in their country, such as illiteracy, poverty, and unemployment. Thus, their third function is to establish partnerships with source countries to create a platform where the common interests of France and source countries with respect to the management of migratory flows are shared (OECD 2008a:31).

Whereas previous pacts had a one-dimensional focus, the French pacts streamline all policies related to migration into a single package. Thus, not only are the pacts multidimensional in terms of focus, but they are also broader in terms of actors, because they delegate to individual government ministries or agencies the power to conclude public-private partnerships with
non-state actors. Examples of such partnerships include those made with banks for reducing the costs of remittance transfers, with migrant collectivities for cofunding diaspora projects, and with industry associations to establish preemployment training centers. For example, bilateral solidarity development funding in the French pact with Tunisia amounts to €20 million, of which €18 million is dedicated to upgrading the education of the Tunisian workforce with the view of increasing employability in the global and national labor market. The remaining funds are reserved for bank loans, which the French Development Agency offers to young Tunisian entrepreneurs (CICI 2009:193).

The French pacts differentiate them from free trade agreements, which also liberalize, but fail to regulate, the temporary movement of natural persons as service providers. The World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Trade in Services is architecturally constrained from regulating migration in a multidimensional manner similar to that with which these bilateral migration agreements have been experimenting. Whereas bilateral migration agreements typically open labor markets to the low-to-medium-skilled workers (Panizzon 2010:10–11, 37, 40; Sauvé 2008:624), trade agreements, notably the multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Services, remain high-skill biased. In addition, the General Agreement on Trade in Services does not provide for a negotiating mandate for World Trade Organization members to agree on rules for regulating the temporary movement of service providers. For now, the General Agreement on Trade in Services multilaterally liberalizes the temporary movement only of natural persons through requesting World Trade Organization Members to open their services markets to foreign-service-supplying persons in what are called “mode 4” market access commitments.

Moreover, French migration pacts confirm the finding that bilateral migration agreements institutionalize and facilitate the processes for recruiting migrant labor (Chanda 2009:479; Stephenson and Delourme 2010:12). Such regulatory features are particularly necessary where lower-skilled labor is to be recruited, for which no private-sector-driven selection processes are in place. In such cases, the host- and source-country governments need to establish facilities, which for high-skilled labor are provided by the transnational networks of multinational corporations (Sassen 1998:47). Yet, most bilateral, non-trade agreements remain asymmetrically tilted toward host-country interests, which are those of immigration control and border security.

The innovative feature of France’s bilateral migration pacts, compared to their precursors, such as the 2000 codevelopment convention between France and Senegal, is to add legal migration as a further element of conditionality to the established nexus between development aid and combating irregular migration. As originally conceived by Brice Hortefeux, the new French
migration pacts are traditionally composed of three interlinked components: a chapter on labor migration, including student mobility; a chapter on control and prevention of irregular migration and border securitization; and a chapter on development cooperation. Official development assistance in the field of migration is one of three components of the new migration pacts and splits into three actions: (a) sectoral aid (“solidarity development”), (b) cofinancing migrants’ investments in their countries of origin (“codevelopment”), and (c) decentralized development aid. The “tone and style” of how the three sub-actions are allocated vary with each pact (Tasca 2008: 33).

Countries that conclude such a migration pact with France are eligible for the largest amount of co- and solidarity development aid, which is bilateral aid. Whereas in 2010, €2 million was earmarked as multilateral aid to solidarity development and a little over €4 million went to reintegration support for individual return migration, the bulk of French official development assistance granted to immigration and integration—€29.5 million—went to bilateral actions under the umbrella of solidarity development (MOB 2009), which is reserved for countries with which France has a bilateral migration pact.

Bilateral solidarity funding tops the “multilateral” solidarity development aid programs (mostly initiatives to reduce the costs of remittances transfers and stimulating a sustainable use of remittances channeled toward projects of source-country development) and reintegration support disbursed to the individual return migrant by the Bureau for Immigration and Integration (Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration). Together, these three actions (multilateral aid, bilateral solidarity actions, and return/reintegration support) form the 301 programs of solidarity development relating to migration (CICI 2009:184). In the multilateral context, codevelopment and solidarity development programs remain separate and are also managed by two different ministries—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for codevelopment and the MIIINDS for solidarity development. Because the MIIINDS has overall responsibility for the French pacts, codevelopment actions, which for the most part fall under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry in the pacts, also fall under the MIIINDS mandate (CIMADE 2009:5).

Some pacts, such as the one with the Democratic Republic of Congo, have not yet identified specific codevelopment actions and thus delegate this task to a committee established to implement the agreement (Article 5:1 and Article 6) (Tasca 2008:36). Other pacts, such as the one with Benin, solicit funding complementary to French codevelopment and solidarity development, such as from private sponsors, professional associations, employer unions, universities, or international organizations, in particular for vocational training (Article 22:7–10).
4.1 Can Solidarity Development Aid Facilitate Labor Migration?

Criticism that PSF project funding had failed to increase the level of entrepreneurial activities by the diaspora prompted the French Ministry on Immigration to design a “sister” concept for codevelopment, named “solidarity development.” The choice of the term “solidarity” refers to the solidarity, which migrants, individually or collectively, naturally demonstrate toward those remaining behind by sending home remittances or engaging in other types of transfers. Moreover, the term alludes to the solidarity France shows toward migrant source countries, particularly its former colonies. Whereas the term “codevelopment” implied a joint responsibility, “solidarity development” points to one-way transfers typical of government-to-government development aid. Solidarity development is not simply a relabeling of codevelopment, but “adds value” to it by widening the financial toolkit, previously limited to cofunding under the Framework Partnership Documents (Tasca 2008:33).

Solidarity development’s new focus on labor migration programs has two goals:

- To ensure that the migrant workforce admitted into France has the skill levels that respond to French labor market needs
- To contain emigration to France by encouraging skill retention and creating employment opportunities in the countries of origin.

The bilateral pact with Tunisia of April 28, 2008, is the first to reflect, by modified treaty structures, “solidarity development.” Concluded as a framework agreement, the pact with Tunisia is implemented by two protocols (Article 5).

The first protocol addresses migration management and contains the modalities for implementing family reunification; circular migration; student mobility; and migration for professional reasons, return, and readmission. An annex contains a list of occupations in which there is a shortage of workers.

The second protocol defines which actions fall under the concept of solidarity development and which fall under development aid. This delineation reflects the internal divide of responsibilities among the different French Ministries. This structure delinks even more clearly than before development cooperation from migration control, in particular migrant returns. There are three annexes, which offer the flexibility necessary for the French and Tunisian Governments to conclude, on an ad-hoc basis, understandings with non-state partners for codevelopment, such as industrial and professional associations, enterprises, and universities.
The first annex lists the various professional and vocational training centers France projects to establish and fund in Tunisia, relating to those occupations for which Tunisia has stated a development need. None of this funding is provided to match diaspora initiatives contributing to the development of the home country. Instead, it is direct government funding to create new training centers or to modernize Tunisia’s preexisting training centers in specifically defined sectors, such as construction, fashion, maritime, metallurgy, and woodworking.

The second annex lists those projects funded by the MIIINDS. These projects relate to fishery and social integration and bank credits to support young entrepreneurs.

The third annex lists development cooperation projects undertaken by other French ministries, which are not financed by the solidarity development fund and which, for the most part, relate to microcredit and support for public health. Based on these annexes, the French Development Agency and the French Association for the Vocational Training for Adults concluded a memorandum with the Tunisian Ministry of Education and Formation and with the Mechanical and Electrical Industries Centre and the Mediterranean Institute of Metallic Technologies.39

Agriculture and fishery are two key sectors that obtain solidarity development funding. Under Article 6:2 of the new pact, France strengthens Senegal’s government-run Retour vers l’agriculture plan, especially its program for reintegrating return migrants, cofunded by France, Spain, and the EU (at a combined total of €20 million). Support for the financial sector in source countries is another typical solidarity development initiative whereby the French Development Agency refines microfinance institutions and those source country banks that give credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

4.2 Health Worker Repatriation and Retention

In Africa, where the emigration of physicians can reach 11.5 percent to 36 percent (Docquier and Bhargava 2006), strategies to incentivize African doctors and health professionals in the diaspora to return to a job in their countries of origin is a key goal of France’s new pacts on migration management. The exception is the pact with Tunisia, where levels of development in the health sector are higher. In terms of health worker repatriation, the pacts with Benin (Article 22:5), the Democratic Republic Congo (Article 5:5), and Senegal (Article 6:1 and Annex II), raise the attractiveness of employment conditions in the source country by establishing a framework for

lending and borrowing medical and technical equipment and for professional training centers on maintaining such equipment. Joint degree programs and a rotation scheme for generalist and specialist doctors and health professionals are planned (Tasca 2008:33). Specific to Benin is the objective of replenishing within three years its health sector with the necessary numbers of health professionals from France.

Skill retention is another solidarity development concern in the health sector. To that end, the pacts establish distance learning programs for medical personnel, a pilot-test phase with micromedical insurance schemes, and decentralized government cooperation between the public hospitals and Brazzaville and Dakar with their counterparts in Lyon and other cities.

4.3 Enhancing the Employment and Employability of the Workforce

With the realization that remittances play a key role in the development of migrant source countries, French migration policies started shifting the ratio between family reunification and student migration and economic migration of highly skilled or talented professionals. France’s Government, under then-Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy, instigated the 2006–07 immigration law reform culminating in the French Immigration and Integration Law 2006-911 of July 24, 2006, and its follow-up Law 2007-1631 of November 20, 2007, relating to immigration, integration, and asylum. Both laws move away from migration, which was perceived as “inflicted” upon France (“immigration subie”) toward attracting labor, preferably “professional” migrants under the new concept of “targeted immigration” (“immigration choisie”) (Chou and Baygert 2007).40

The new policy declared that priority be given to professional migration. This was done through designing a new entry category, the “skills and talents” admission card, but also by limiting family reunification and by increasing the number of deportations, through stricter enforcement of readmission agreements. To step up these efforts at readmissions, the President of the Republic set an annual target number of repatriations that the Minister of Immigration had to attain. Both factors led to gradually increased expulsions—from 18,735 in 2006 to 19,885 in 2007 to 19,274 in 2008 (Van Eeckhout 2009).

France continues to emphasize encouraging voluntary returns, and it seems that its new pacts have resulted in a successful policy mix combining channels for lawful migration with strict enforcement of readmissions and codevelopment tools. In a reversal of a previously high-skill-biased recruitment policy, France now “actively solicits low qualified labour” which,

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40 In 2007, family reunification was already down to 85,800 (10.6 percent). Since 2007, migration for work has increased by 14 percent, and 33,000 new migrant workers entered France in 2008.
as it officially states, “complements” the common interests France and source countries have with respect to the management of migratory flows (OECD 2008a:31).

Yet, France could not ignore the fact that many source countries of migrants, namely former colonies in West and North Africa, would be disadvantaged by the change in terms of migrants’ skill levels and categories admitted. Thus, France did three things:

- By decree, on January 18, 2008, it loosened its high-skill recruitment policy (“immigration choisie”) (OECD 2008a:31) by drawing up lists of occupations in France in which there was a shortage of workers (shortage lists), to fast-track the recruitment of foreign labor for jobs in high demand in the French labor market (Cholewinski 2008:296). Countries signing a bilateral pact with France may add occupations to the shortage list of 60 occupations. France relaxes the work authorization process for these listed occupations by eliminating the economic needs test.
- Solidarity development funds preemployment vocational training centers to increase the employability and competitiveness of potential migrants. Reflecting a global trend, development aid emphasized the creation of employment and training centers in source countries (Tasca 2008:19). The old PSF cofunding scheme had failed to stimulate more diaspora entrepreneurship precisely because emigrants entering France prior to the reforms had for the most part been economically inactive, given that most were children or women migrants issued from family reunification or those admitted on student or stagiaire visas. These categories of migrants often did not have entrepreneurial skills or enough funds to contribute to the development of their country of origin.
- Public-private partnerships are concluded by the French immigration authorities with French employers or employer unions with the view of facilitating “the recruitment of foreign workforce according to business needs” (EMN 2010:22). A primary goal of these public-private partnerships is to fast-track the work authorization process for certain economic sectors where there are recruitment difficulties and thus an acute need for foreign workers, such as for caregiving, logistics, and transport personnel. A subsidiary but no less important policy objective is to shorten the delays in accessing work for those foreign job seekers who have signed a Reception and Integration Contract with the French Government, and prevent them from remaining unemployed for too long, which often results in such job seekers “l lapsing into informal or illegal work” (EMN 2010:22). So far, the following public-private partnerships have been concluded in a migration/employment context:
A tripartite understanding on vocational training links France’s Ministry of Immigration to Tunisia’s Ministry of Education and the Mediterranean Institute of Metallic Technologies Menzel Bourguiba. These understandings establish the modalities for spending the 80 million Tunisian Dinars that France projected for supporting 17 projects listed in Annex I of the pact’s Protocol on Development over three years rather than to seek out complementary funding.

An understanding was signed by the MIIINDS and the Vinci Construction company on April 11, 2009, to encourage foreign nationals who have signed a Reception and Integration Contract to apply for jobs in that company.

An agreement that directly facilitates recruitment of foreign nationals between the MIIINDS and the Casino Group whereby the Casino Group will give priority to the recruitment to those job seekers that the French Bureau for Immigration and Integration has recommended.

A partnership agreement with the French National Agency for Lifestyle and Home Care Services of June 2008 is geared toward training (including language training) those job seekers who have signed a Reception and Integration Contract, who are interested in taking a job in the caregiving sector. The memorandum of understanding, which MIIINDS signed with the Council of French Enterprises in Africa (Conseil des Entreprises Françaises en Afrique) on June 16, 2010, has a similar purpose.

A partnership agreement between the Director General of the French Bureau for Immigration and the car manufacturer, Renault Maroc, and the French Consulate in Casablanca on July 19, 2010, to support the professional training program of Renault Maroc’s subsidiary, the Renault Tanger Exploitation (S.A.S.), for the categories of executives, managers, and specialists, and nonessential automobile manufacturing workers. The main goal of that convention is to establish a one-stop-shop application procedure for obtaining an entry visa and an admission card for those Moroccan trainees pursuing Renault’s training program and having to dislocate for that purpose for a limited time to Renault’s headquarters in France.

A tripartite agreement signed in June 2009 between Club Med and the Labor Union for occupations in the food, agriculture, hotel and restaurant, and tobacco sectors, and with the European Federation of Employers for the agriculture, food, and tourism industries.

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sectors. The primary goal of that agreement is not so much the recruitment of foreign labor, but to ensure the fair labor conditions of foreign workers employed by Club Med in its Europe-African zone.42

Yet, the spill-over effect from labor mobility on job creation and source-country development overall depends on the preexisting level of education of the migrant (Broadman, Pouget, and Gatti 2010). Whereas codevelopment, in particular structural aid programs in the abovementioned sectors requiring skill upgrading of the workforce, such as health, agriculture, or construction, can contribute to improving the skill level of a source country’s human capital, the effect also depends on the level of policy coherence among French labor recruitment strategy, the openness of its labor market, and the type of return policies funded (short-term skill transfer missions by highly skilled migrants, circular migration visa).

For example, the number of jobs actually created by return migrants in the context of a French codevelopment project aiming at reintegration varies. The numbers range, for example, from one to seven for Mali and Senegal to much lower numbers for similar occupations in Eastern Europe. The one to two jobs created for Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania, for example, could imply that the initial skills levels of persons emigrating from those countries differ starkly from those of other countries and that their prospects of receiving skills upgrading in a French job are lower. However, the difference may also be explained by cultural factors; for example, in an African context it takes more persons to do one particular job than in an Eastern European context. In addition, regarding Senegal, the fact that it was not the lower-skilled or unemployed Senegalese migrants in France that were returning voluntarily to Senegal and using development funds to reintegrate by setting up sustainable enterprises led France to realize its codevelopment policies were draining skills from Senegal and not targeting the “right persons.” Such considerations may have led France to open more lower-skilled occupations to lawful labor migration in its bilateral migration pacts (CICI 2009:211). For example, France’s migration pacts with Senegal and Tunisia have opened the French labor market to seasonal migrant workers, which are capped at 2,500 entries annually for Tunisia (Guibal 2009:27).

5. Source-Country Replications of Codevelopment: The Case of Senegal

In the case of Senegal, France’s codevelopment strategies have worked reasonably well in areas where the Senegalese Government replicated the general direction or objective of France’s migration policies. The Senegalese Government has been successful in identifying its nationals abroad and launching information campaigns to mobilize the diaspora to take responsibility for the development of their local communities. For instance, the government-run Investment Promotion and Major Works Agency, founded in 2000 under the auspices of the President of the Senegalese Republic, was essential for enticing the diaspora in France to invest in Senegal’s infrastructure development, by building villages and sanitizing the water supply.

The Senegalese Investment Promotion and Major Works Agency also uses the funds from loans made by foreign governments, such as those of France and Germany, to finance projects facilitating the economic reintegration of return migrants. The “Entrepreneurship Diaspora” initiative of the Investment Promotion and Major Works Agency of Senegal has been replicated by at least three other ministries (Exterior, Women Entrepreneurship, and Senegalese Abroad and Tourism), which compete against each other for diaspora funds. The Ministry of Senegalese Abroad and Tourism installed an Internet portal in June 2008 to keep in touch with emigrants.43 The portal feeds into an International Organization for Migration-run census project of Senegalese living abroad, the purpose of which is to categorize migrants according to their professions.

In addition, the portal targets Senegalese abroad as brokers of foreign direct investment. Unfortunately, none of these ministerial information platforms makes available cofunding to match transfers of migrants to their home communities, unless they have obtained French Government funding to do so (Ndione and Bröekhuis 2006:16–18). Statistical information on their success in attracting private capital by migrants is difficult to find. Since 2008, France and Spain have been helping Senegal and West Africa build their own administrative ability to manage migration. For instance, Spain established the Foundation of Senegalese Emigrants (Fondation des émigrés sénégalais) to facilitate diaspora-led investments in Senegal. This competition may infuse new life into the deadlocked and inefficient institutions that France had been cofunding since the 1980s.44

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43 www.senex.sn.
44 The Council of Senegalese Abroad and the Bureau of Integration, Information and Follow-up for Emigrants (Bureau d’Accueil, d’Orientation et de Suivi des Actions de Réinsertion des Émigrés) had been mandated to provide support for the reintegration of migrants, but have had limited success due to “administrative deficiencies, and migrants’ lack of confidence in the organization,” despite obtaining up to 400 million West African CFA francs (Gerdes 2007:3–4).
5.1 Migrants as Facilitators of Foreign Direct Investment and Brokers of Joint Ventures

Senegal shares with France the longest experience with codevelopment funding of any African country. The Franco-Senegalese development program is also the one that is most participatory in terms of the multiplicity of actors involved. The diaspora in France finances up to €3.3 million worth of projects in Senegal, while Senegal is one of the few African governments to match French funding—of €9 million for three years, starting in 2009—with €0.57 million (CICI 2009:195–96). In addition to cofinancing migrants’ collective capital investments, the Franco-Senegalese partnership developed newer strategies, which encourage migrants to act as pathbreakers of foreign direct investment into Senegal or to broker joint ventures between a host-country firm and a Senegalese counterpart. The “Caravane of SMEs in Italy,” initiated by Senegal’s Ministry of Family, Women’s Entrepreneurship and Micro-finance, is such an initiative. It formalizes and facilitates the joint ventures, business contacts, and professional networks, which lower-skilled Senegalese workers in the Northern Italian towns of Brescia, Lecco, and Parma had been establishing between their employers, food processing SMEs in Northern Italy (dried tomatoes and biscuits), and Senegalese agricultural producers (Panizzon 2008). The “bridge-building” function of such migrant networks is valuable for European SMEs that do not have the funding for obtaining destination-specific information. As Leblang (2009) shows, migrants have the advantage of knowing the conditions in the field, which may decrease the information asymmetry of a foreign direct investor about the country where the foreign investment is projected. For example, prompted by the many Senegalese workers in the area, the city of Parma has proposed receiving charter flights by Air Sénégal International and making freezer storage space available for storing tomatoes flown in from Senegal to have them dried in Italy (Senegal Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises 2006).

5.2 NGOs Issued from Migration

Until FRONTEX, the European Union’s border management agency, tightened border controls on the West African coast and started to clamp down on clandestine out-migration, there were no Senegalese NGOs active in migration. It was mostly NGOs in Europe, such as the French Panos Institute and the French Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development that had launched their own codevelopment projects investing in large part in Senegal’s infrastructure (for example, public facilities and water sanitation) (de Haas 2006:74). The 140 founding members of Gie Tekki fi ci Sénégal (“to succeed here in Senegal”), the only Senegalese NGO engaged in migration so far, were coincidentally all return migrants from Spain, that is, people who had been repatriated in the course of their clandestine journey at sea or during an attempted unauthorized entry into Spain (Panizzon 2008). Hometown associations from Senegal in France, such as the Association Drôme Ouro Sougui, have been particularly active among West African communities in
transferring skills and investing in their communities of origin (de Haas 2006:76–79; Ndione and Bröekhuis 2006:17–18). In view of codevelopment’s multistakeholder strategy, it will be important to cooperate with NGOs issued from migration.

5.3 International Codevelopment: Complement or Competitor?

Various codevelopment initiatives exist at the international level, such as the United Nations Development Programme’s Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals, launched for Senegal in 2002 with US$200 million, and the United Nations Digital Diaspora Network, launched in 2003 for Africa, both of which complement France’s codevelopment tools. The Migration for Development in Africa program, which promotes links between the immigrant communities in Italy and their hometowns in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal, is perhaps the international program most tailored to facilitating migrant entrepreneurship, even if it has not yet been launched for France. One of its key components is a database where Senegalese residing abroad can register their interest in contributing to the development of their country of origin and list their skills (de Haas 2006:29).

On a more political level, the United Nations Development Fund for Women calls for mobilizing diaspora resources as an additional way to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Kampala Declaration 2003). The majority of Malian and Senegalese populations, particularly the unemployed workforces, have not really benefited from codevelopment initiatives, which primarily have targeted elites in cities. Islamic tradition and French cultural values are similar in their view of the desirability and value of intellectual careers and academic exchanges.

6. Conclusions: Advantages and Limitations of France’s Codevelopment Concept

This chapter has described the manifold facets of codevelopment. It has shown that France went through a “learning process” and reinvented the concept as it internalized feedback from the diaspora. Codevelopment never quite lost its close link to return migration, a fact summarized in the slogan that codevelopment was designed to give a human face to a security agenda (“visage humanitaire d’une politique sécuritaire”) (Lacroix 2009:15). Yet, gradually, codevelopment was redefined as a long-term strategy of development cooperation, rather than a short-term disbursement of return and reintegration support. Today, France’s codevelopment savings account and bank passbook offer a valuable incentive mix of tax breaks and penalties, which has pioneered for Europe a promising new path for government-subsidized diaspora engagement. Even if more research needs to be undertaken on the costs of defiscalizing migrants’ savings, which are invested productively in the countries of origin, a first appraisal leaves no doubt that
the French ministry in charge of migration and development no longer incurs the administrative costs of transferring development funds.

This chapter argues that these new fiscal instruments are promising, because migrants are encouraged to bancarize their savings, which in turn helps to develop the banking sector in migrants’ countries or origin. More critical is the fact that the French Government identifies, often without consulting the country of origin, the type of products into which migrants must invest in order to obtain the tax break.

The new strategy of individualizing codevelopment aid by offering tax breaks to migrants’ savings has shifted the paradigm by relying less on migrant communities and more on an individual migrant’s responsibility. Because only a few migrants from West and North Africa would have the capacity to take advantage of the targeted labor migration system introduced by France’s immigration law of July 24, 2006, France’s new pacts on migration management introduced labor market admission quotas for occupations in which there was a shortage of lower-skilled workers and cofunded vocational and professional training centers.

The emphasis on labor migration as a development issue marks another important change of focus in France’s codevelopment strategy. The new policy mix, known under the labels of codevelopment, solidarity development, and decentralized government cooperation, and framed by France’s immigration laws and its new pacts, has the potential to create the right incentives for migrants to contribute to their source countries’ development and to mobilize their governments to match their investments.

Codevelopment has, however, been criticized for the following reasons:

- Placing the migrants themselves “at the heart of the process” has been overly idealistic. Not every migrant has the capacity, potential, or resources to be a manager, entrepreneur, or broker of joint ventures.
- France has often failed to “verify if the capacity of home structures allow the ‘productive’ returns of migrants.” Corrupt practices, pressure by family members, and administrative difficulties in countries of origin have been underestimated (Wihtol de Wenden 2008:5).
- A channel for disbursing direct government-to-government aid, solidarity development is a sobering reversal from the overly idealistic partnership approach where the high hopes held in associating immigrant associations and NGOs in fostering development were not met.
- Codevelopment—in its classic sense of cofunding diaspora projects—failed to distinguish between migrants in unauthorized stays and those
lawfully in France. This led to the paradox effect of clandestine immigration being somewhat rewarded.

The codevelopment savings account alleviated such concerns, since it is only available to migrants with valid documentation of stay in France. Counterintuitive as it may seem, France’s new pacts on migration management have increased the coherence of France’s migration policies, because structurally, codevelopment and solidarity development are mainstreamed into France’s migration policies toward that specific country, alongside securitization of borders, readmission, and police cooperation, but also labor migration and integration strategies. For the concept to be more effective in the future, France should seek to incorporate similar initiatives formulated by international organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration’s Migration for Development in Africa program; the United Nations Development Programme’s Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals; and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Vocational Training program. So far, references in France’s new pact have been limited to Senegal’s government-run Retour vers l’agriculture plan and the pact of the Democratic Republic of Congo with the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

France’s long-standing experience with interlinked migration and development policies is “highly instructive” for countries that have only recently developed initiatives in the field (de Haas 2006:67). While France’s codevelopment evolved because of the intensity of cultural, scientific, economic, and linguistic ties or shared education systems that have facilitated Eurafrican exchanges, it will be challenging for other migrant host countries that lack such links to replicate France’s incentives.
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